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Economics research in Europe has experienced an accelerated development. Part
of it has to do with demography, economic growth and the increase of resources
devoted to education in affluent societies. But there are many aspects in the evolution
of our profession that could have gone wrong, and yet took a good turn thanks to
the action, the determination and the example provided by a few persons.
Today we are celebrating one of them, Profesor Jacques Drèze. He has a lot
to do with the positive directions that economics has taken in Europe. His example
as a researcher, as an institution builder, as an educator and as a concerned European
citizen has provided generations of economists with guidance and direction. He
will tell us about his research interests and his concerns and advise for our economies.
Hence, my introduction will concentrate on his contributions as a leader of the
profession.
In the sumer of 2009, a little more than one year from now, about two thousand
economists will gather in this Bellaterra campus of UAB and on that of the UPF
downtown in order to attend the annual joint meetings of the European Economic
Association and of the Econometric Society, organized in cooperation among all the
institutions that constitute the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
Jacques Drèze was President of the Econometric Society in 1970, and a founder
first President in of the EEA.
Founded in 1985, the EEA is an organization that looks both at the intellectual
foundations of economics but also at its implications for policy and reform. It is also
commited to quality, openness and service, and has contributed in differnt ways to
develop economics in Europe. Its first meeting in Viena, held in 1986, gathered 600
participants and 150 contributed papers. In last year’s joint meetings in Budapest
there were ten times more papers, around 1500 papers. Indeed, things have exploded.
But size is not what matters most. The EEA is contributing to give a truly
international dimension to our profession, by introducing good practices that keeep
permeating and help to redress the many bad habits of smaller national communities.
It sustains a journal, organizes summer schools, and when time came, it provided
great help for Eastern European colleagues to recover their contact with modern
7
economics. One of its major contributions to internationalization of our profession
is to promote mobility by sustaining a job market. (To our pride, the job market
structure adopted by the EEA is the one first started by the Spanish Economic
Association, whose remote origins are in the Autónoma’s Symposia for Economic
Analysis). Of course, it could be doing more, and sometimes Professor Drèze has
expressed his concern about the role of this baby of his, and how to improve it. But
something is and will remain true: that Jacques’ first thrust to the EEA, his
“chiquenaude primitive”, provided the organization with an excellent start.
Let us now turn to the Econometric Society, of which he was also President.
It was created much much earlier, in the early nineteen thirties. It has always been
a meeting point for economists commited to excellence in any part of the world. Its
European Congress met in Barcelona in 1971, and its seventh world congress was
also held in our city, in 1990. Its comeback in 2009, hand to hand with the EEA,
will be like meeting an old friend. But not as old as it could be, since the first time
that the ES had a congress in Spain was much earlier, fifty years ago. This happened
in Bilbao, just when the economics department there was being born.
In EEA Bilbao meeting.
A young and hyperactive Jacques Drèze participated in this Bilbao meeting,
already a part of the small elite that was to blossom into what are now massive
gatherings. The minutes of the Bilbao meeting point out at how much, indeed, our
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profession has evolved since then. There were 90 participants and fifteen papers
altogether. The proceedings, were published in Econometrica, including summaries
of the discusions: a total of 22 pages, written in French. I am sure that many of my
colleagues, who hate large meetings, would sign up for a chance to attend the 1958
one. I certainly would too. But those who were there must have been proud , over
the years, to see economics blossoming from such a small start. And we are certainly
proud to have Jacques Drèze here today to recognise the role of those pioneers.
But this involvement in large organizations is not his only contribution to the
development of our profession, by any means. An even more fundamental one has
consisted in building institutions and programs that have set standards of quality for
all of us. In 1966 he was the founder of CORE, a research institute that was, for years,
THE place in continental Europe where things did happen. A place for visitors, a
place for the creation and exchange of ideas. CORE is still a important research center,
although its main success was to loose its monopoly, thanks to its success in setting
standards and proving that they could be upheld. In the words of Profesor Drèze
himself: “The contribution of CORE to economics in Europe is less the research
output produced in-house than the stimulus to others by the simple example that it
could be done”. I think that this may not do justice to in-house production, but it is
certainly a fact that CORE was an example. It was, in particular, for those of us
Europeans who were students in the US in the late sixties and early seventies. Then,
the only working papers coming from continental Europe that were available in US
departments of economics libraries had CORE’s pale blue covers. This certainly an
inspiration for the Bellaterra founders. The first economics Working Papers in
Spain started to be published in our department in the mid seventies.
In 1978, CORE joined forces with Bonn and LSC to create the first cooperative
European Doctoral Programme, based on cooperation with the best possibe partners.
Again this is a path that others, including us have taken. Again, yet, Jacques Drèze
pioneered on cooperation, this time in connection with graduate education.
All these abilities in organizing have been the consequence of Jacques Drèze
enormous authority, based on academic excellence and personal integrity.
Let me illustrate this trait of character by a simple anecdote. In the eighties,
I was invited to participate in the evaluation committee for the first grants given to
economics within the framework program of the EU. It was a great honor for me
to sit on that committee, close to giants like EdmondMalinvaud and Jacques Drèze,
and I learned a lot about evaluation, fairness and good practice from participating
in this panel. However, the Comission bureaucrats and the politicians in charge
seemed to be worried about the standards of behavior of economists, and had
imposed a mathematician to chair our meetings, with Professor Malinvaud as vice-
chair. At some point, the mathematician left, and a new chairman was needed.
Then, a newmember was parachuted into our group, an economist that was obviously
trusted by the politician in charge. At lunchtime, it became apparent that he had been
offered the chair by his friend. In the afternoon, the politician appeared and proposed
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the newcomer as chair. I was horrified. We had been guided by Drèze andMalinvaud
for over a year, worked with all rigor and fairness: what else did they want? With
the proposal and a heavy silence on the table, with all the calm he is able of, Jacques
Drèze looked at all of us, and then told the proposer, in very quiet terms that we had
a great vice-chair and a natural leader in Profesor Malinvaud, and that we expected
him to be our chair. It took one second for the politician to hold back and a few
minutes to end the session. The parachuted candidate was never to be seen again
in our meeetings. Where others would have made a big fuzz or started complicated
negociations, Jacques just stated the truth, called for respect, and held to his
convictions.
Respect and inspiration is also what Jacques Drèze transmitted as a teacher.
My colleague and former student at CORE, Xavier Martínez Giralt remembers his
course in general equilibrium with devotion: his relaxed voice, his ability to show
the fundamentals, his probing and stimulating questions. And, above all, the way
in which, while distributing the work assignment of the week, he declared “This
problem set should take you about three hours of intelligent work”. As Xavier says,
after five hours of swetting, you started wondering about yourself!
I will not discuss at length other important characteristics of Jacques Drèze’s
personality. But let me just say that he is a consumated sailor and a man of peace.
I will finish with a few words on his research. I am sorry not to have been able
to benefit from his guidance and teachings more often, but we were lucky to have
him at the Autónoma and in Madrid 1991, as the first invited profesor of a program
that was established at that time by the BBV foundation. On that ocasion, I introduced
him with a few words in Spanish that I will now reproduce in English.
“Jacques Drèze is the autor of many articles and half a dozen books. This is a
lot, but many can say the same afer a lifetime of work. What makes him much
more special is the variety of fields he has worked on, and where he has
contributed to push the frontiers of knowledge. He has worked on foundations:
game theory, large economies,existence issues. He has made important
contributions to public economics, the theory of labor managed economies
and the foundations of finance. The behaviour of economic agents under
uncertainty has been an underlying thread across much of his work: he has
studied its consequences on many dimensions of economic importance, like
savings, insurance, investment or employment.
In addition to these microeconomic issues, he has also made contributions
to econometrics, in particular from the Bayesian point of view. Not to speak
about his work on macroeconomics, both theoretical and policy oriented.
You cannot say that Jacques Drèze is a microeconomist, an econometrician
or a macroeconomist; nor that his work is theoretical or applied. He is all of
that, a whole economist. When most of us have to cultivate a part of the field
and hold to it, even arguing about its importance relative to other plots, he
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just embraces the whole. That’s it. It sounds simple, but I challenge you
to look for a list of people about whom you could say the same”.
I would just like to finish with my thanks to the University, for joining us








Europe’s persistent unemployment: is there a way out?
This address will be devoted to a topic that has been on my mind for thirty years,
namely ever since unemployment exploded in Europe in the wake of the first oil
shock. That historical development had a profound and lasting impact on my
research interests and activities. Short of attempting to summarise the resulting
work, I will concentrate tonight on a simple issue: are we, as economists, facing
squarely the challenge of coping with Europe’s persistent unemployment?1
The issue
Unemployment in Europe was remarkably low in the fifties and sixties. It started
rising in the mid-seventies, and has hovered around 9 percent for over two decades
now. This persistence of a wastefully high level of unemployment is a major
challenge to economists and policy makers alike.
Also, we have seen clear expressions of disenchantment with the EU, quite
notably in France and the Netherlands in 2005. If the EU wishes to inspire its
citizens again, coping with lasting unemployment is the number one item on the
agenda.
Is economic policy in the EU partly accountable for this dismal situation?
Alternatively stated, could suitable policies provide a way out of this dismal situation?
If so, would the responsibility for such policies rest with the member states, or is
there a role for the EU itself?
Before addressing these questions, we provide some readily accessible
background information about the diagnostic.
Background
In 2003, the average unemployment rate (henceforth u) was 8.0% for the EU15. There
is a sharp difference though between the four “big” continental countries –France,
Germany, Italy and Spain– where the average unemployment rate was 9.6% and a
group of six countries –Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the
UK– where the average was 4.8%, i.e. half as much.2
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1. The address is largely based on a proposal developed two years ago with my friend and colleague Henri
Sneessens, who would under other circumstances appear as a co-author of the address, and whom I thank
cordially for his permission to use the product of our joint work. A binding time constraint did not
allow for updating the data and references.
2. The five remaining members of EU15 (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxemburg and Portugal) offer con-
trasted pictures, with Belgium close to the Big Four.
The Big Four account for some 64% of the active population in EU15, compared
to 27% for the second group of six. Thus, the Big Four incarnate much of the
European unemployment problem! Yet, it is not demonstrated that they followed
an inferior route from the viewpoint of the welfare of their citizens3.
The contrast gains special relevance from the observation that the latter six
countries had, over the period 1980-2000, pursued labour market reforms that were
relatively neglected in the Big Four; see Nickell (2003) and further comments
below.4
Within the ten countries under consideration (and others), substantial regional
disparities prevail. They are illustrated in Table 1, which reports on the distribution
of unemployment rates in the 171 (Nuts2) regions making up these ten countries.5
Understanding these regional disparities is also part of the research agenda.
Other disparities deserve attention. One of them concerns age. In every member
country of the EU15, the unemployment rate of young members of the labour force
(ages 15-24) is roughly twice as high as the overall rate.7 This is a significant
observation, interpreted by some economists as an indicator of deficient aggregate
demand for labour, under rigidity of low wages.At the same time, activity rates
among the elderly are low, and the number of inactive but fit early retirees (18
million!) is roughly equal to the number of unemployed, in EU 15.
Another significant disparity concerns the relative unemployment rates of
unskilled vs skilled workers. Figure 1 illustrates how the difference between the low-
skilled and the average unemployment rates have evolved over time. Although
Table 1: Regional distribution of unemployment rates
u<5% 5<u<7.5% 7.5<u<10% 10<u<12.5% u>12.5%
Big Four 10 6 29 32 12 19 102
Group of 6 48 18 3 0 0 69
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3. Comparing welfare between France and the US, Daniel Cohen concludes that low-skilled workers are
probably better off in France, thanks to the social protection and in spite of the higher unemployment;
see “Welfare comparisons across French and US Labour Markets”, CEPR DP 2114, 1999.
4. References identified by author and date are collected at the end of the note.
5. Nuts2 refers to a category used by the EU Statistical Office. Four overseas French departments (with
u > 20%) are omitted here.
6. All of these are in Northern Italy. But Italy contributes 6 regions with u>12.5%.
7. Main exceptions are Germany (only 1.5 times as high, due to the efficient apprenticeship system there)
and UK (2.5 times as high).
partial, the data suggest clearly that the increase has been much stronger in France
and Germany (two of the Big Four) than in the US or in the UK.
Figure 1: Low-Skilled unemployment rate
(difference with aggregate unemployment rate)
Skills and inactivity are related: in the population aged 15-64, the inactivity rate is
47% for the low-skilled, 24.5% for the medium-skilled, but only 13% for the high-
skilled.8
A fourth disparity concerns gender. Figure 2 compares male and female
employment rates in a subset of EU countries. Female employment rates are
systematically lower; they are especially low in the big countries.
When these disparities interact, such as for unskilled young workers in high
unemployment regions, they result in appallingly high unemployment rates, up to
50% in some cases.
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8. We have not seen data on regional unemployment by skill levels, except for Spain; see Mauro, P. and
A. Spilimbergo, “How do the skilled and the unskilled respond to regional shocks? The case of Spain”,
IMF Staff Papers 46-1, 1999, which finds that “the highly skilled migrate very promptly in response to
a decline in regional labour demand”.
Figure 2: Employment rates and gender (15-64)
Policy concerns
Against this background, the EU Council, at its 2000 meeting in Lisbon, set itself
the goals (confirmed in March 2005) of:
– increasing employment while modernising social protection systems;
– improving the adaptability of workers and enterprises;
– increasing investment in human capital.
It also adopted quantitative targets for 2005 and 2010 for overall employment,
female employment and employment of the elderly (aged 55-64).
The concern with the elderly is linked to the current increase in life expectancy
(with correlative ageing and decline of overall activity rates), which creates problems
of sustainability for the prevailingly Pay-As-You-Go pension systems.
At the beginning of the intermediate year 2005, the targets were not attained:
the total employment rate stood at 63.3% instead of the targeted 67%; the rate for
women stood at 55.7% instead of 57%.
Other grounds for concern are linked to:
– enlargement; unemployment rates in the ten NewMember Countries average
some 13%, and wage levels there are well below EU15 levels; this raises the concern
of labour migration, apt to exacerbate unemployment in the EU15;
– globalisation and the competition from low-income countries, which adversely
affects unskilled workers in the EU;
– high-tech; the Lisbon objectives aim to make the European Union “the most
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dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world”, through
education, research and development; the implications of that goal for employment
(especially of the low-skilled) are as yet unclear.
Policy assignment
In March 2005, the Lisbon Strategy was given a new start, “focusing the European
Union’s efforts on two principal tasks – delivering stronger, lasting growth and
more and better jobs”.
One important element of the Lisbon re-launch is the overhaul of its governance
structure “to define more clearly the respective responsibilities at the national and
the Community level.”9 A “Community Lisbon Programme” has been defined for
matters decided at the EU level; national policies have to be defined through country-
specific National Reform Programmes. Although these adjustments stress the need
for more elaborated and coordinated actions, the basic principle remains that “the
design and implementation of macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment
policies lies primarily with member states”.10
Regarding macroeconomic policies, the “Stability and Growth Pact” (SGP)
initiated in Maastricht delegates responsibility for monetary policy to the European
Central Bank (ECB), with the primary objective of maintaining price stability.
Curiously, exchange rate policy remains the domain of the Council. Fiscal policy
is the domain of the member states , subject to the guideline of containing overall
deficits in each country within 3% of GDP.
The higher exchange rate of the past years is bound to have affected unfavourably
the demand for labour in the EMU11. When the dollar/euro ratio fell below unity,
some discontent was voiced. A relatively high parity goes hand-in-hand with
relatively high nominal interest rates, and with lower inflation.
The national economies in Europe are quite open, with trade flows averaging
some 33% of GDP. But two thirds of these flows are between member countries.
Trade of the EUwith the rest of the world is still limited to 11% of GDP. Accordingly,
responsibility for fiscal stance (though not for specific fiscal policies) should rest
with the Union, not with the member nations. Although obvious, this point is not
recognised in the Maastricht-Lisbon assignment of responsibilities.
The distinction between “fiscal stance” and “fiscal policies” is important.
Clearly, the choice of specific fiscal instruments like tax rates or public expenditures
should remain in the hands of member states. But the overall fiscal stance of the Union
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9. EU Commission (2005) "Common Actions for Growth and Employment: The Community Lisbon
Programme" COM(2005)330 final.
10. Basically, the EU operates under the principle of “subsidiarity”: responsibility lies by default with
the member states, EU-level responsibilities are limited to a an agreed set of specific tasks.
11. It is worth noting that three of the six countries with low unemployment do not belong to EMU (Denmark,
Sweden and the UK).
is in itself an important policy instrument, calling for conscious policy choices,
instead of being left to evolve from national policies constrained by the SGP. How
to implement a Union-level fiscal stance, without curtailing unduly the country-level
options for specific policies, is a genuine challenge that has not so far been faced
squarely in the EU. Clearly, it deserves attention.
Another major defect of the SGP is that no distinction is drawn between the
current and the capital accounts. A balanced current account allows for a maximum
of 3% net investment, no matter how productive. Conversely, the sale of assets
(e.g. privatisation of public enterprises) is treated on par with current receipts.
The SGP has not been implemented as initially planned and has been subject
to much debate. But the current structure still entails disregarding fiscal stance as
a stabilisation instrument at the EU level – whether it might operate through current
deficits or through public investment. And yet, the possibility of an aggregate
demand deficiency cannot be excluded, as hinted above and elaborated further
below.
Is there a way out?
Over the years, our understanding of the situation has evolved. To some extent,
this has reflected changing approaches to macroeconomic theory as well as changing
political outlooks. But we have also learned from experience, notably because
policy adjustments and the evolution of unemployment have not been uniform
across countries and over time.
According to Stephen Nickell (2003), labour market reforms might explain some
50% of the unemployment differentials between the Big Four and the Group of
six.
Nickell’s work is part of a larger stream of research aimed at explaining the
intertemporal and/or the intercountry differences in employment performances in
Europe over the last half century12. It fits the trend of a more and more privileged
attention to the supply side – labour market reforms - as opposed to the demand side
– macroeconomic stabilisation policies - in the search for policies able to meet the
unemployment challenge.
Olivier Blanchard (1999, p. 57) concludes a stimulating lecture on “European
Unemployment: the role of shocks and institutions” with a message of optimism.
He writes: “If demand policies are used to maintain growth and help reduce actual
unemployment in line with equilibrium unemployment, more progress on labour
market reforms is possible. In short, a more favourable environment and better
labour market institutions may at last lead to the reduction of European
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12. See e.g. Blanchard (1999), Heckman (2003) or Ljunqvist (2003) for expository reports.
unemployment.” In a sense, this conclusion brings us back to the theme of “two-
handed” policies that was stressed in earlier discussions of employment-promoting
policies.13
Blanchard’s conclusion recognises that both feasibility and effectiveness of
labour market reforms are enhanced by growth, thereby providing an additional
argument for demand-stimulating policies in Europe.14
Can this argument suffice to convince the EU Council that it should accept a
responsibility for demand stimulation and stabilisation? Probably not by itself. But
perhaps a convincing case can be made for a specific EU-level program of temporary
(and timely!) demand stimulation through public investment. Public investment
has been neglected for many years in Europe, and the SGP is not helping in that
respect. There is thus ample scope for socially productive investments. The
Community Lisbon Program recognises the need to develop the infrastructure in
relatively backward regions, and reiterates a commitment to develop Trans-European
communication Networks (TEN).
Most of the arguments levied against fiscal stimulation fail to apply to
investment. Further, there is scope for targeting the investments on projects with
intensive use of low-skilled labour, thereby directly addressing the core unemployment
problem while avoiding inflationary pressures. One area where extensive needs
could be met in this way is the provision of low-cost housing; see Drèze et al.
(2000).
Linking an investment program to labour market reforms (in the Big Four!) is
germane to “increasing employment while modernising the social protection
systems”, the first of the three Lisbon objectives listed above.
Retroacts
The same spirit was present in the position paper of 13 Belgian and French economists
convened twelve years ago by Jacques Drèze and Edmond Malinvaud (1994),
“Growth and Employment: the Scope for a European Initiative”. The economic
conditions at the time were generally comparable to the present ones – except for
the creation of the EMU in the meantime. That document called for an ambitious
program of public investment in low-cost housing, urban transportation and
international communication; coupled with supply-side measures aimed at more
efficient labour markets. The more distinctive element of the latter measures called
for reduced employer contributions to social security at the low end of the wage scale.
Further recommendations included wage moderation and “streamlining” the social
protection system. Clearly, the spirit of the Blanchard conclusion was there.
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13. See e.g. Blanchard et al. (1985).
14. Also, the message of optimism may be related to Blanchard’s discussion of persistence. Two key
considerations there come from the duration dependence and marginalisation associated with high
unemployment. Employment growth is also likely to reverse these effects through persistence.
The same spirit was also present in “An Economists’ Manifesto on
Unemployment in the European Union” issued by Franco Modigliani et al. (1998).
That document also insists on two-handed policies, stressing how the two sides
reinforce each other. It also turns to investment for demand stimulation. And it
goes into a detailed review of supply-side measures “to introduce a substantially
higher degree of flexibility in the European labour and product markets”.
These two pleas for two-handed policies were completely ignored, in what
regards the demand side. Wage subsidies (reductions of employers’SS contributions)
at and near minimumwages, where they will not be passed through in higher wages,
received some attention, especially in France and Belgium; they remain a natural
suggestion, also with the European dimension discussed in Drèze (2002).
Academics and politics15
Taking stock so far, an ambitious European investment program coupled with
further labour market reforms, especially in the Big Four, seems to define a
promising way out of Europe’s persistent unemployment. So, why is that program
absent from today’s policy agenda, or even debate?
My answer is blunt: because it lacks widespread advocacy and support from
European academic economists! How could we expect policy makers to adopt a
sophisticated policy mix, if it is not advocated widely by the economics profession?
The question is all the more pregnant today, because the balanced policy mix at stake
deviates substantially from the liberal creed of non-intervention that has gained
many adepts!
My answer is blunt, because it takes for granted that academic economists
have a role to play in the design of economic policies. Is that obvious?
For those among you who heard or read the address on a similar occasion by
our distinguished friend or colleague Hugo Sonnenschein,16 the answer to my
question is perhaps ambiguous. Let me quote briefly.
Sonnenschein’s ideal is universities primarily concerned with “the discovery,
preservation and transmission of knowledge… (within) a perspective that celebrates
the development and testing of ideas”. This ideal is contrasted with “a fearful image
of universities… seeking solutions to the most pressing and complex social problems
and promoting national economic growth.” The pressure on universities to deliver
such solutions “could in the long run prove very injurious”. Hence, academic
economists need not be concerned with policy design.
Yet, there is also room for a positive answer, if I may quote the conclusion:
“Universities should be places where we can think hard and independently about
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15. Also, the message of optimism may be related to Blanchard’s discussion of persistence. Two key
considerations there come from the duration dependence and marginalisation associated with high
unemployment. Employment growth is also likely to reverse these effects through persistence.
16. The material to follow was not discussed with Henri Sneessens; “we” becomes “I”.
the ideas that are…most likely to change the way that we view… our opportunities
for the future.” With this conclusion, I agree wholeheartedly.17 Its link to the ideal,
and its break from the fearful image, come from the reference to “ideas” that “change
the way we view our future”.
Admittedly, the position papers that I have referred to above do not fully
qualify on these grounds. So I turn briefly to work that, in my opinion, falls squarely
within Sonnenschein’s conclusion, while being relevant to our policy challenge. This
paves the way towards my own conclusion.
Macroeconomic implications of General Equilibrium Theory
At the risk of oversimplification, I regard the theoretical discipline of economics
as consisting today of two distinct branches, namely microeconomics and
macroeconomics. The former is concerned with abstract models of economic
interactions among individual agents solving fully specified decision problems,
i.e. problems defined by the objectives and opportunities of the agents. The latter
is concerned with abstract models of how such macroeconomic variables as national
income, inflation or unemployment interact and evolve. Born with Keynes in the
thirties, macroeconomics (including monetary theory) has developed into a complex
discipline, with an empirical (econometric) as well as a theoretical side. It faces the
twin challenges of linking the empirics and the theory, and of relating the
macroeconomic variables to the underlying decision problems of individual agents.
The latter challenge is often described as the search for “microeconomic foundations
of macroeconomics”.
I have myself defended on several occasions the alternative methodological
stance of searching for “macroeconomic implications of microeconomics”. Let me
explain concisely. Most work in microeconomics addresses specific problems (say,
equilibrium on a single market, or decision criteria for business firms under
uncertainty); but there is one theoretical development that concerns the whole
economy, as described by the set of all individual agents (households and firms)
interacting through markets. The resulting structure is known as “General Equilibrium
Theory” (GET). It was initially developed by Léon Walras, then formalised after
World War II by Kenneth Arrow, Gérard Debreu, Lionel McKenzie and their
followers. In a fundamental sense, GET is concerned with the functioning of the whole
economy, exactly like macroeconomics. But it is regarded today as the culmination
of microeconomics, and is not integrated with macroeconomics. The lack of
integration is vividly illustrated by the fact that such concepts as national income,
inflation or unemployment are not operationally defined in GET.
To date, GET has been mainly concerned with such properties as existence,
efficiency, stability a.s.o. of economy-wide equilibria on competitive markets;
namely, on markets where individual agents trade commodities (goods or services)
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17. “The purpose of the university”, Bellaterra, April 1994, passim.
in pursuit of their own objectives, taking market prices as given. In relation to
economic problems of the real world, the competitive markets paradigm is inadequate
on (at least) four grounds:
1) many markets of relevance to agents do not exist; this remark applies with
force to future contingencies: a worker concerned about the possibility of
dismissal cannot contract for another job in July 2010 contingently on
restructuring of her present employer…
2) market transactions consist in exchange of commodities against money, not in
barter; “fiat money” (as we call it) is a manmade contraption, with a logic of
its own, different from that governing the use of goods and services; financial
assets play an important role in macroeconomic evolutions;
3) markets do not universally clear by prices alone; rationing constraints are
common - especially for the supply of labour, leading to involuntary
unemployment at downwards rigid wages; or for commodities produced under
set-up costs;
4) many agents exercise market power: they do not take prices as given, but set
prices in their own interest; that is, competition is “imperfect”.
These four departures from the competitive-markets paradigm mean that
Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory is of limited relevance to many pressing
economic problems, foremost among which I would rate Europe’s persistent
unemployment!
Today, inflation, unemployment and the trade-off between these two evils
belong to the province of macroeconomics. My own methodological creed is
different. The basic methodology of GET calls for analysing the interactions among
a set of individual agents, each solving a well-defined problem under feasibility
constraints emerging endogenously from the said interactions. That basic methodology
can be applied to more complex situations than specified by the competitive,
complete markets Walrasian model. Indeed, there exists ample work extending that
model to incomplete markets, to fiat money, to price-wage rigidities or to imperfect
competition. Today’s challenge is to integrate these four extensions, so as to take
into account their joint implications, which are more complex than the sum of their
separate implications.
To illustrate briefly, the absence of contingent markets for future jobs explains
why downward wage rigidities are desirable: they offer a second-best alternative
superior (on grounds of risk-sharing efficiency) to sequential competitive clearing
of labour markets; cf Drèze and Gollier (1993). So, market incompleteness is at the
root of price-wage rigidities leading to involuntary unemployment. This in turn
justifies macroeconomic policies –monetary or fiscal- apt to stimulate both labour
market flexibility at non-competitive wages, and aggregate labour demand.
One crucial joint implication of incomplete markets and non-competitive
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market clearing is the emergence of multiple equilibria; for instance, there may
arise a trade-off between inflation and unemployment, a locus of equilibria labelled
“Phillips curve” by economists. Under incomplete markets, expectations of agents
replace market signals in guiding individual decisions. A major advance in our
understanding of expectation formation has come with the concept of “rational
expectations”, namely expectations congruent with economic theory as defined by
John Muth fifty years ago and used routinely by macrotheorists today. But defining
rational expectations under a theory that allows for multiple equilibria is a challenge
that has not been met squarely to date. It belongs on the agenda of developing the
macroeconomic implications of microeconomics, within a General Equilibrium
framework extending to incomplete and non-competitive markets. Part of the
difficulty arises from the observation that monetary developments (inflation) and
rationing (unemployment) do not reflect objective primitives of an economy; they
reflect human policy decisions (monetary policies, wage settlements), not objective
primitives. And these are the key variables about which “rational” expectations
should be formed, in a context of multiple equilibria!
So, is there a way out?
I have just alluded to some key concerns of my own research over the past years
(since my official retirement in 1989), a brief preliminary account of which can be
found in Drèze (2001, 2005).18 That research fully confirms the need of two-sided
policies to cope with Europe’s persistent unemployment. It also supports the merits
of the more specific proposals outlined above, namely reduced labour costs for
unskilled work combined with public investments. In commenting on that episode,
I wrote (in 1999): “With six years of hindsight, I marvel at how closely a collective
policy proposal could anticipate the conclusions of theoretical research still in the
making. I now realise that the research outlined here was not only motivated by policy
issues. It was also inspired by the policy discussions. This illustrates the benefits
from interaction between policy concerns and theoretical research. I regard that
interaction as crucial for the long-term program of integrating micro- and
macroeconomics into a unified discipline.”
I have no doubt that our friend Hugo regards such integration as belonging on
the agenda of his ideal university. Let me express the hope that your distinguished
university may collaborate with mine, and with other leading universities in Europe,
towards implementing that theoretical program! We may then be able to train a
new generation of economists who will agree on the policies best apt to eradicate
Europe’s persistent unemployment. Away out will then be in sight. There is a long
way to go, so let us not waste a single minute!
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18. I have myself defined universities as institutions that incarnate the “consciousness of evolution” in
our societies; see “L’université dans la société contemporaine” in La Revue Nouvelle, Bruxelles, June
1965.
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[36] “Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price rigidities”, International
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A risk-averse firm with imperfect information about demand elasticity behaves
as if it faced a kinky demand curve; this leads to (real) price stickiness.
[52] “Public Goods with Exclusion”, Journal of Public Economics, 13, 1, 5-24, 1980.
Applies the theory of equilibrium with quantity rationing to public goods with
exclusion, thereby providing the first theoretical analysis of such goods in a
general-equilibrium framework.
[53] “Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability”, Econometrica, 48, 4, 987-
1003, 1980. (With J. Greenberg.)
Considers cooperative games with a coalition structure [37] where players’utilities
depend upon the imputation and upon the coalition to which they belong.
Pareto efficiency may then require transfers among coalitions. Stability of the
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coalition structure may require default penalties.
[54] “Réduction progressive des heures et partage du travail” in Les Conditions de
l’Initiative Economique,4ème Congrès des Economistes de Langue Française,
3ème Commission, 2-4; 57-83, 1980.
An outgrowth of [56] and [49], providing the theoretical framework for
interpreting the results of a survey conducted among Belgian firms.
[55] “Optimality Properties of Rationing Schemes”, Journal of Economic Theory,
23, 2, 131-149, 1980 (With H. Müller.)
Second-best welfare analysis of alternative rationing schemes, establishing
the superiority of coupons equilibria and discussing their information content
for desirable price changes. Also led to [75].
[56] “The Trade-off Between Real Wages and Employment in an Open Economy
(Belgium)”, European Economic Review, 15, 1-40, 1981. (With F. Modigliani.)
An analysis of the short-and long-run wage elasticity of employment, with an
original Bayesianclassical econometric evaluation for Belgium, the introduction
of the union-wage model and a discussion of work sharing.
[57] “Inferring Risk Tolerance from Deductibles in Insurance Contracts”, The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 20, 48-52, 1981.
A new approach to measuring risk-aversion, with striking conclusions about
plausible numerical ranges.
[58] “La Belgique dans la crise et la contrainte de balance des paiements”, Recherches
Economiques de Louvain, 47, 55-78, 1981. (With J. Dermine.)
Advocates devaluation of the Belgian frank (prevailing opinion notwithstanding)
and provides a surprisingly accurate forecast of the effects of the 1982
devaluation.
[59] “State-Dependent Utility, the Demand for Insurance and the Value of Safety”
in The Value of Life and Safety, Proceedings of a Conference held by The
Geneva Association, Ed. M.W. Jones-Lee, North-Holland, 41-65, 1982; and
in Premium Calculation in Insurance, Eds. F. de Vylder et al., D. Reidel, 77-
107, 1984. (With P. Dehez)
An outgrowth of [12], adds the public goods dimension to the demand for
safety based on a value of life reflecting willingness-to-pay and relates the analysis
to insurance behavior; rests on the theory of decision with state-dependent
utility in [8, 76].
[60] “Decision Criteria for Business Firms” inCurrent Developments in the Interface:
Economics, Econometrics, Mathematics, Eds. M. Hazewinkel and A.H.G.
Rinnooy Kan, D. Reidel, North-Holland, 27-51, 1982.
An outgrowth of [33], but also of [21]; a synthesis of approaches and results
on risk attitudes of firms in stock-market economies; develops the CAPM as
a special case of complete markets.
[61] “Bayesian Analysis of Simultaneous Equations Models” in Handbook of
Econometrics, Eds.
40
Z. Griliches and M. Intriligator, North-Holland, Chap. 9, 517-598, 1983.
(With J.-F. Richard.)
A survey paper providing an integrated exposition of the approach and of
results in [34, 39, 41, 44], with some extensions.
[62] “On Industry Equilibrium under Uncertainty”, Journal of Economic Theory,
33, 1, 88-97, 1984. (With E. Sheshinski.)
A follow-up to [42] investigating dynamics.
[63] “On Supply-Constrained Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory, 33, 1, 172-
182, 1984. (With P. Dehez.)
An outgrowth of [36] and intervening work by Vander Laan; extends [36] to
production and proves existence of supply-constrained equilibria (i.e., equilibria
with constraints on supply but not on demand), at arbitrary relative prices
under a flexible price level. Used contructively in [113].
[64] “Second-Best Analysis with Markets in Disequilibrium: Public Sector Pricing
in a Keynesian Regime”, European Economic Review, 29, 263-301, 1985;
also reprinted in The Performance in Public Enterprise: Concepts and
Measurement, Eds. M. Marchand, P. Pestieau and H. Tulkens, North-Holland,
45-79, 1984.
Extends the Ramsey-Boiteux second-best analysis to the case of price rigidities
and quantity rationing in the private sector; includes my first encounter of the
Keynesian multiplier in a general equilibrium model.
[65] “Rigidité des prix, rationnement de l’offre et inflation”, Cahiers du Séminaire
d’Econométrie, 26, 13-23, 1984. (With P. Dehez.)
A companion paper to [63], less technical and application oriented.
[66] “Labour Management and General Equilibrium” in Advances in the Economic
Analysis of Participatory and Labour-Managed Firms, JAI Press Inc., 1, 3-20,
1985; version française: “Autogestion et équilibre général”, Revue Européenne
des Sciences Sociales, 22, 66, 208-229, 1984.
A non-technical version of [40].
[67] “(Uncertainty and) The Firm in General Equilibrium Theory”, Economic
Journal,95 (Supplement: Conference Papers), 1-20, 1985.
An outgrowth of [33], extending the decision structure of firms from stockholders’
meetings to boards of directors; production plans are chosen by endogenously
appointedmanagersdirectors, under unanimity rule with side-payments and subject
to majority approval by stockholders; probably the most realistic decision
structure in the general equilibrium literature; preview of chapter 2 in book [3],
which supplies the proofs.
[68] “Econometrics in the General Economics Curriculum: Teachers in a Quandary?”,
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 30, 3, 97-102, 1985.
A discussion of classical versus Bayesian econometrics from the view point
of pedagogical efficiency, offered to my colleague and friend John van
Waterschoot on his retirement.
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[69] “Employment and Growth in Europe: ATwo-Handed Approach”, CEPS Paper
21, Bruxelles 1985. (With O. Blanchard, R. Dornbusch, H. Giersch, R. Layard
and M. Monti.)
A report of the CEPS-DGII Macroeconomic Policy Group, largely written by
Blanchard and Dornbusch, stressing the complementarity of supply and demand.
[70] “Moral Expectation with Moral Hazard” in Contributions to Mathematical
Economics in Honor of Gérard Debreu, Eds. W. Hildenbrand and A. Mas-
Colell, North-Holland, 187-204, 1986; version française: “Espérance morale
avec risque moral”, L’Actualité Economique.
Excerpts from [76], limited to moral hazard (with state-independent preferences).
[71] “ADiscussion of Belgian Unemployment, Combining Traditional Concepts and
Disequilibrium Econometrics”, Economica, 53, 89-119, 1986. (With H.
Sneessens.)
Amacro-econometric model allowing for an evolving mixture of Keynesian,
classical and inflationary regimes; formed the basis for the 10-countries study
presented in book [4].
[72] “What, If Anything, Have We Learned from the Rise of Unemployment in
Belgium, 19741983?”,Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, 110/111, 21-26, 1986.
(With H. Sneesens.)
A companion presentation of [71].
[73] “Work Sharing: Some Theory and Recent European Experience”, Economic
Policy,1,3, 561-619, 1986.
A comprehensive paper discussing the theoretical rationale for work sharing,
then documenting and analysing the historical experience of several European
countries, in the late seventies early eighties.
[74] “Reducing Unemployment in Europe: The Role of Capital Formation”,CEPS
Paper 28, Bruxelles, 1986. (With F. Modigliani, M. Monti, H. Giersch and R.
Layard.)
Another CEPS-DGII report, largely written byModigliani andMonti, focussed
on investment.
[75] “Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices”, Econometrica, 54, 6, 1271-
1318, 1987. (With R. Aumann.)
A game theoretic analysis of economies with fixed prices, showing the
convergence of the Shapley value to uniform coupons equilibria; an alternative
interpretation covers economies with satiated preferences; an outgrowth of
[36, 55], with a technical tour de force by Aumann.
[76] “Decision Theory with Moral Hazard and State-Dependent Preferences”, chap.
2 in Essays in Economic Decisions under Uncertainty, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Chapter 2 of book [2]. Anticipated by [8], but technically more advanced;
provides a general treatment of decision theory with moral hazard and state-
dependent preferences, as an extension of subjectively expected utility theory,
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with extensive comments. Expected utility maximisation applies to the choices
of probabilities (strategies) in games of “strength and skill”. Subjective
probabilities and state-dependent utilities are fully identified if and only if all
events have strategy-dependent probabilities. The only treatment to date based
on preferences revealed by choices.
[77] “Underemployment Equilibria: From Theory to Econometrics and Policy”,
EuropeanEconomic Review, 31, 9-34, 1987.
Presidential Address to the European Economic Association. A public lecture
and introductory chapter to book [5]; concise presentation of the theory of
equilibria under price rigidities and quantity rationing in [36, 63], possibly due
to increasing returns [82]; the econometrics of quantity rationing models ([71]
and book [4]); and two-handed employment policies [79].
[78] “Eurosclerosis: ADisease of the Economies, or the Economists?”, Comment on
“Slow Growth in Europe: Conceptual Issues” in Barriers to European Growth,
Eds. R.Z. Lawrence and C.L. Schultze, Washington D.C, pp. 79-83, 1987.
A non-technical appraisal of barriers to recovery in Europe.
[79] “The Two-Handed Growth Strategy for Europe: Autonomy through Flexible
Cooperation”, CEPS Paper 34, Bruxelles, 1987; and Recherches Economiques
de Louvain, 54, 1, 5-52, 1988. (With C. Wyplosz, C. Bean, F. Giavazzi and H.
Giersch.)
Another CEPS-DGII report, largely written with Charles Wyplosz; extends the
two-handed approach of supply and demand policies to cooperative
implementation through differentiated national policies.
[80] “Macroeconomic Policy in Europe: Autonomy through Cooperation”, European
Economic Review, 32, 353-362, 1988; version française: “Une stratégie
ambidextre pour l’Europe: l’autonomie par la coopération” in Gestion de
l’Economie et de l’Entreprise. L’Approche Quantitative, 1326, CORE, De
Boeck Université, Bruxelles, 1988. (With C. Wyplosz.)
A concise synthesis of [79].
[81] “L’arbitrage entre équitéet efficacité en matière d’emploi et de salaires”, 8ème
Congrès des Economistes de Langue française, Commission 6, Chap IV, 121-
146, 1988; reprinted in Recherches économiques de Louvain, 55, 1, 1-31 1989;
also reprinted in Book [5].
Some degree of wage-rigidities is second-best efficient when the deadweight
loss of taxes used to finance income transfers is high, or when incomplete
markets prevent risk sharing; see also [101].
[82] “Competitive Equilibria with Quantity-taking Producers and Increasing Returns
to Scale”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 17, 209-230, 1988. (With P.
Dehez.)
Extension of the Arrow-Debreu model to non-convex technologies; competitive
behaviour is captured by pricing rules specifying, for given quantities, minimal
prices compatible with voluntary trading; existence is proved.
43
[83] “Distributive Production Sets and Equilibria with Increasing Returns”, Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 17, 231-248, 1988. (With P. Dehez.)
A complement and companion to [82]. Under non-decreasing returns overall
(output distributive production sets), the existence result of [82] holds under
the natural assumptions of voluntary trading and zero profit (free entry).
[84] “L’autogestion et la théorie économique: efficacité, financement et emploi”, in
G. Quaden, Ed., L’Entreprise Coopérative, Tradition et Renouveau , Annales
de la Chaire de Coopération, pp. 55-70, Labor, Bruxelles, 1988; translated as
“Self-Management and Economic Theory: Efficiency, Funding, and
Employment”, Chap. 15 inMarket Socialism,P.K. and J. Roemer, Eds., Oxford
University Press, 1993.
An outgrowth of [40] and book [3], with attention to funding and employment
policies of labour-managed firms.
[85] “Generic Inefficiency of Stock-Market Equilibrium when Markets are
Incomplete”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1990. (With J. Geanakoplos,
M. Magill and M. Quinzii.)
An outgrowth of [33]; in stock-market economies with production decisions
geared to shareholder preferences, equilibria are generically inefficient; changes
of production plans, inducing changes in state-contingent relative prices, can
be Pareto improving.
[86] “Méthodes quantititives et décisions économiques”, Chap. 5 in Modélisation
et Décisions Economiques, Proceedings of the Symposium for the XXth
Anniversary of CORE, Ed. H. Tulkens, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1990.
An expository survey of research at CORE, bringing out the complementarities
of economic theory, operations research, econometrics and game theory.
[87] “AProposal for ‘COperative Relief of Debt in Africa’ (CORDA)”, in Evolution
of the International and Regional Monetary System, Eds. A. Lamfalussy, A.
Steinherr and D. Weiserbs, Macmillan, London, 1989; version française:
“Coopération pour le réglement des dettes des pays d’Afrique, des Cara¬ıbes
et du Pacifique (CORDA), Cahiers de la Faculté des Sciences Economiques
et Sociales, Namur, 1988. (With A. Kervyn de Lettenhove, J.-P. Platteau and
P. Reding.)
Written at the request of “Justice and Peace”, a proposal for market purchase
of African debt by the European Union, redefinition of debt obligations on the
basis of ability to pay and use of proceeds to fund a Marshall plan for Africa;
received some official attention, but was perhaps too ambitious for practical
implementation.
[88] “Maurice Allais and the French Marginalist School”, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 1989.
Presentation of Maurice Allais for the Nobel Award; draws heavily on [13].
[89] “Schuld en Cooperatie in de Mundiale Ekonomie”, in Leuvense Ekonomische
Standpunten, 49, 1989.
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A lecture based on [87].
[90] “Tales of Testing Bayesians” inContributions to Econometric Theory, Eds. R.AL.
Carter, J. Dutta and A. Ullah, 1990. (With M. Mouchart.)
Classical test statistics can be relevant to Bayesian decisions; three examples.
[91] “The Role of Securities and Labour Contracts in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-
Bearing”, in H. Loubergé, Ed., Risk, Information and Insurance. Essays in the
Memory of Kark H. Borch, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston., 1989;
reprinted as chap. 11 in Underemployment Equilibria: Essays in theory,
Econometrics and Policy, 1991.
An extension of the CAPM to labour contracts; efficiency calls for wages
indexed in part on the CPI and in part on nominal national income, with
individually chosen weights.
[92] “Stability of a Keynesian Adjustment Process” in W. Barnett, B. Cornet, C.
d’Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszevicz andA.Mas-Colell, Eds,Equilibrium Theory
and Applications, Chap. 9, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
A natural adjustment process for a constant returns economy, with quantities
moving faster than prices and downward price rigidity, leading in a bounded
number of steps to a supplyconstrained equilibrium, as defined in [63].Includes
both a tâtonnement and a non-tâtonnement specification.
[93] “European Unemployment: Lessons from aMulti-Country Econometric Study”,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,92 (2), 135-165, 1990; translated as “Le
chômage en Europe: conclusions d’une analyse économétrique multinationale”,
L’actualitéEconomique, Revue d’Analyse Economique, 68, 359-389, 1992.
(With C. Bean.)
Preview of [94].
[94] “Europe’s Unemployment Problem: Introduction and Synthesis”, in J.H. Drèze,
C. Bean, J.P. Lambert, F. Mehta and H. Sneessens, Eds, Europe’s Unemployment
Problem, Chap. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass),1990.
(With C. Bean).
Introductory chapter to book [4] which collects ten econometric studies of
employment in OECD countries, based on the disequilibrium approach of
[71]; presentation of the model and summary of results, with discussion.
[95] “Can Varying Social Insurance Contributions Improve Labour Market
Efficiency?”in Alternative to Capitalism: The Economics of Partnership, A.B.
Atkinson, Ed., Macmillan, London, 1993.
An outgrowth of [81] and [91]; implementing efficient labour contracts through
cyclical variations of social security contributions; includes a discussion of
social security contributions collected as a profit share à laWeitzman.
[96] “From the ‘Value of Life’ to the Economics and Ethics of Population:The Path
is Purely Methodological”, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 58, 2, 1992.
Outgrowth of [12] and [59]; the value of life concept relevant to the problems
of safety is not relevant to problems of population, but the methodologies
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suitable for the two problems are related.
[97] “La capitale de l’Europe, le marchéet les pouvoirs publics locaux: murmures
d’analyse et d’anticipation économiques”,Comptes Rendus de la SociétéRoyale
d’Economie Politique de Belgique, 470, 3-5, 1992.
A public lecture on urban economics, with emphasis on taxation of land rents
to finance infrastructure and on improving mobility through road pricing.
[98] “Temps de travail: Leçons européennes et perspectives belges”, La Revue
Nouvelle, 46-59, 1993.
A non-technical update and summary of the empirical findings of [73].
[99] “Europe’s Unemployment Problem”, Fundacion BBV Lecture, Madrid, 1993;
reprinted in European Review, 2, (1), 73-82, 1994.
A non-technical version of [94].
[100] “1 Market+1 (tight) Money = 2 Rules of Fiscal Discipline: Europe’s Fiscal
Stance Deserves Another Look”, in European Economic Integration: A
Challenge in a ChangingWorld, M. Dewatripont and V. Ginsburgh, Eds., North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1994.
An early warning against the deflationary impact of simultaneous budget
consolidations; advocacy of cooperative fiscal policies in Europe; includes
a survey of econometric simulations and an appendix on fiscal policies under
quantity rationing and uncertainty. Debt-financed fiscal stimulation is
appropriate provided demand outgrows supply over the period between
the stimulation and the retirement of the debt.
[101] “Risk Sharing on the Labour Market and Second-Best Wage Rigidities”,
European Economic Review 37, 1457-1482, 1993. (With C. Gollier.)
A systematic presentation of the case for limiting wage flexibility, both
upwards and downwards, and for some degree of wage discrimination by hiring
date, to achieve more efficient risk sharing when markets are incomplete.
[102] “Regions of Europe: A Feasible Status, to Be Discussed”, Economic Policy,
266-307, 1993.
Regions could belong directly to the Europe of nations, without being part
of a national state; merits and implementation are discussed; a principle of
“distributive neutrality” leads to define transfers for seceding regions that prevent
endless secessions.
[103] “Growth and Employment: The Scope for a European Initiative”, European
Economy, Reports and Studies,1, 75-106, 1994; traduction française: “Croissance
et emploi: l’ambition d’une initiative européenne”, Revue de l’OFCE, 49, 247-
288, 1994. (With Edmond Malinvaud, Paul De Grauwe, Louis Gevers,
Alexander Italianer, Olivier Lefebvre, Maurice Marchand, Henri Sneesens,
Alfred Steinherr, Paul Champsaur, Jean-Michel Charpin, Jean-Paul Fitoussi,
Guy Laroque.)
A collective position paper, advocating a cooperative growth initiative in
Europe combining lower interest rates, elimination of labour taxes on lowwages,
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public investment programs, a leaner but strengthened welfare state, wage
moderation, taxation of interests and ofCO2 at European level. Still pertinent...
[104] “Growth and Employment: The Scope of a European Initiative”, European
Economic Review 38, 1994. (With Edmond Malinvaud.)
A concise synthesis of [103].
[105] “Technical Development, Competition from Low-Wage Economies and Low-
Skilled Unemployment”, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 185-214, 1994;
translated in French as “Progrès technique, mondialisation et travail peu
qualifié”, chap. 3 in Scenario pour l’emploi,M. Didier, Ed., Economica,
1995. (With Henri Sneessens.)
The market position of unskilled workers has deteriorated due to biased
technical progress, competition from low wage economies and relative
stagnation of manufacturing employment. Lower labour costs, at unchanged
incomes, are needed and discussed.
[106] “Forty Years of Public Economics: A Personal Perspective”, The Journal of
Economic Perspectives,9,2, 111-130, 1994.
An overview of developments in public economics; outgrowth of editing a
volume of selected papers by William Vickrey, and based on a lecture
presenting that volume at an AEAmeeting.
[107] “Report of the IEACommittee on a New School of Economics and Economic
Development (SEED) in the ThirdWorld”, Journal of Public Economics, 55,
1-18, 1994. (With K. Arrow, A.B. Atkinson, K. Basu, S. Honkapohja, A.
Krueger, J.-A. Morales, and N. Stern.)
A committee report prepared for the International Economic Association,
assessing the desirability and feasibility of organising a new School of
Economics as a centre of excellence in a third-world country.
[108] “L’emploi en Europe”, Recherches Economiques de Louvain,2, 159-180,
1995.
A public lecture and opening chapter of book [7], summarising my views on
the causes of and remedies for European unemloymant as of late 1994.
Presented in Toulouse as the second annual lecture of IDEI.
[109] “Small Banks are Beautiful. Can it last?”, in Economic Development and
financial Intermediation: Small Firms, Local Banks and Cooperative Credit
,IRCEL, Roma, 1996.
Drawing on fifty years of loose association with a small country bank, reviews
the merits of smallness, the evidence on scale economies and the survival
conditions for small banks.
[110] “Sur la spécificitééconomique des soins de santé”, Economie et Prévision,
Economie et Prévision, 129-130, 1997.
An invited editorial, presenting in non-technical terms the case for a
health system combining universal compulsory insurance, deductibles
and partial coinsurance, and supply controls, to overcome the problems
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of adverse selection, moral hazard and agency/asymmetric information in
health care.
[111] “Research and Development in Public Economics; William Vickrey’s Inventive
Quest of Efficiency”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99, 2, 179-198,
1997.
Presentation of William Vickrey’s work for the Nobel Committee.
[112] “Temps choisi et partage du travail”, Sociétéroyale d’Economie politique de
Belgique, 497, 4-37, 1997; reprinted in The Right to Work: Towards Full
Employment, M. Archer and E. Malinvaud, Eds, Pontifical Academy of
Social Sciences, Vatican City 1998, 307-338.
Updating of [73] and advocacy of a 4-days week.
[113] ”Walras-Keynes Equilibria, Coordination and Macroeconomics”, European
Economic Review, 41, 1737-62, 1997.
In decentralised market economies, supply-constrained equilibria (as already
studied in [63]) may persist as coordination failures, sustained but not caused
by price rigidities. This feature may be arbitrarily severe, even at prices
compatible with competitive equilibrium. The model includes both goods with
flexible prices and goods with fixed prices.
[114] “Investment Stimulation, with the Example of Housing”, BEI Papers,Volume
3, 1, 99-114, 1998; revised, Recherches économiques de Louvain, 66, 1, 33-
53, 2000. (With A. Durré and H. Sneessens.)
Following upon a suggestion formulated in [103], and drawing upon data for
Wallonia, this paper spells out a program of investment in public housing
seen as an instrument of demand stimulation in Europe.
[115] “William S. Vickrey 1914-1996: A Biographical Memoir”, 75, National
Academy of Sciences, (1998)
Memoir outlining Vickery’s career, contributions and research style.
[116] ”Money and Monetary Policy in General Equilibrium”, Chap. 4 in A.P.
Kirman and L.A. Gérard-Varet, Eds, Economics Beyond the Millennium,
Clarendon, Oxford, 1998 (With H. Polemarchakis.)
Introducing money and transactions demand equilibrium models; existence,
indeterminacy and suboptimality results; the basis for part 2 of book [6].
[117] “Public Economics, Public Projects and their Funding”, Asian Development
Review, 15, 1-17, 1999.
A lecture on the contribution of public economics to the analysis of public
projects and of their funding. The case for funding public projects on world
capital markets is presented and applied to the denomination of LDC debt.
[118] “On the Dynamics of Supply-Constrained Equilibria” in P.J.J. Herings, G. van
der Laan and
A.J.J. Talman, Eds, Theory of Markets, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1999.
A dynamic extension of [113]. The paper defines a simple tâtonnement
process of adjustments in prices and quantities, where excess demand results
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in nominal price increases and excess supply results in quantity rationing of
supply at unchanged prices. Under standard assumptions, the process converges
to a supply-constrained equilibrium. Includes a stylised application to monetary
(interest rate) policy.
[119] “Jobs and Economic Security in the 21st Century” in H. Löffer and E.W.
Streissler, Eds, Soziapolitik und Ökologieprobeme der Zukunft, 65-96,
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1999.
At the invitation of the Austrian Academy of Sciences on the occasion of its 150th
anniversary, this lecture takes a long run ex ante view of social protection and
concludes on the role of (macro-) securities for promoting mutual insurance
among the nations of Europe.
[120] “The formulation of Uncertainty: Prices and States”, Chap. 3 in G. Chichilnisky,
Ed.,
Markets, Information, and Uncertainty, Essays in Economic Theory in Honor
of K.J. Arrow,
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK, 1999.
Returning to the theme of [21], a comparison of temporary equilibrium and
incomplete markets models and a discussion of whether prices should appear
in the definition of states. Concludes instead that prices wil in general affect
preference orderings.
[121] “Moral Hazard and Conditional Preferences”, Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 31, 159181, 1999. (With A. Rustichini.)
Conditional expected Utility theories, based on hypothetical preferences
among outcomes conditional on states, are reconciled with decision theory
under moral hazard [76]. The hypothetical preferences conditional on arbitrary
events are well defined when and only when either states are fully exogenous
or states are under full control of the agent.
[122] ”Intertemporal General Equilibrium and Monetary Policy”, Chap.2 in A.
Leijonhufvud, Ed., Monetary Theory as a Basis for Monetary Policy,
Macmillan, London, 1999. (With H.M. Polemarchakis.)
The monetary general equilibrium model of [116] is used to define a
comprehensive monetary policy, to show that control of nominal interest
rates controls at equilibrium expected inflation but not inflation variability,
and to illustrate sources of monetary non-neutrality.
[123] “State-Dependent Utility and Decision Theory”, in S. Barbera, P. Hammond
and C. Seidl, Eds, Handbook of Utility Theory, 2, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2004.
(With A. Rustichini)
Survey article on a topic of long-standing interest [8, 70] as well as current
research [121].
[124] “On theMacroeconomics of Uncertainty and Incomplete Markets”, Recherches
Economiques de Louvain,67 (1), 5-30, 2001; reprinted as Chap. 3 in J.H.
Drèze, Ed., Advances in Macroeconomics, Macmillan, London, 1999; French
49
translation: “Sur la macroéconomie de l’incertitude et des marchés incomplets”,
Revue de l’OFCE, 72, 7-37, 2000.
Presidential Address to the International Economic Association, summarising
semi-formally recent theoretical work on wage rigidities [101], coordination
failures [113] and the dynamics of supply-constrained equilibria [ll8]. Policy
conclusions relate to investment ([103], [114]), cyclically adjusted labour
taxes [95] and macrosecurities [119].
[125] “Economic and Social Security in the Twenty-First Century, With attention
to Europe”,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(3), 327-348, 2000.
A partly heuristic attempt at exploring long-run policies aimed at a second-
best compromise between ex ante risk-sharing efficiency and ex post productive
efficiency. Wage subsidies for low-skilled workers financed by taxes on high
wages are advocated, together with improved risk sharing between capital and
labour, between generations and between the countries belonging to EMU.
[126] Globalizzazione e titolarizzazione dell’assunzione di rischio, Assicurazioni,
LXV, 3, 251-64, 2000.
A non-technical lecture at the Award ceremony of the INA Prize. Discusses
the case for globalisation of risk sharing, the limits of existing arrangements,
including securitisation, the scope for private-public partnerships, and potential
improvements to international or intergenerational risk sharing.
[127] “Monetary Equilibria”, Chap. 5 in G. Debreu, W. Neuefeind andW. Trockel,
Eds, Economics Essays A Festschrift for Werner Hildenbrand, Springer
Berlin Heidelberg New York, 2001 (With H.M. Polemarchakis.)
A definitive presentation of the model used in [116] and [122], with minimal
assumptions and with proofs.
[128] “Advances and Challenges in Macroeconomics” in J.H Drèze (Ed.), Advances
in Macroeconomics,Palgrave, London, 2001.
A critical synthesis of 16 lectures on advances in macroeconomics presented
to the Twelfth World Congress of the International Economic Association.
[129] “PAIR, une Proposition pour la relance de l’aide au développement et pour
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